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Abstract 
Background: 
In Sweden, mergers between Swedish parent companies and domestic subsidiaries are in 
most cases carried out with a continuation of the tax burden, while mergers between 
Swedish parent companies and foreign subsidiaries are, in principle, not. The exception is 
when the Swedish intra-group deduction rules apply. However, they are very limited in 
their scope and application. It is uncertain whether such difference in treatment between 
domestic and foreign subsidiaries is compatible with Sweden’s obligations towards the 
EU. 
Results: 
 In regards to cross border merger rules, EU law makes a difference between rules which 
are built upon the Merger Directive and those who are not. When the directive applies, 
domestic and foreign subsidiaries are, in principal, to be treated in the same way. 
However, in regards to mergers which do not qualify for the benefits of said directive, EU 
law allow for some difference in treatment between domestic and foreign subsidiaries. 
Nevertheless, in a merger, a taxpayer must, as a minimum standard, be able to deduct 
losses in a foreign subsidiary, if the losses are considered final in accordance with the case 
law of the CJEU.  
Conclusion: 
The Swedish rules which are adopted based on the Merger Directive are incompatible 
with EU law. The Swedish rules applicable to other kinds of mergers are incompatible 
with EU law in regards to their limited loss calculation, however, compatible with EU law 
in regards to their limitation to factual losses. 
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1   Background 
1.1   Background to the issues in Sweden 
1.1.1   The pending case before The Supreme Administrative 
Court of Sweden 
 
In July 2016, the Swedish Board for Advanced Tax Rulings (“BATR”) 
delivered a decision on the utilisation of foreign losses in Sweden, when a 
German subsidiary was being merged into a Swedish parent company.1 Due 
to continuous losses, the German company was to be wound up and the 
operations in Germany would stop in its entirety. Therefore, the company 
asked the BATR to determine whether the Swedish parent company would 
have the right to deduct the losses in Germany if the German subsidiary 
would be absorbed by the Swedish parent.  
The facts of the case, which were undisputed, were that there were no other 
company in Germany in which the existing losses could be utilised in, and 
therefore no existing or potentially future profits to offset the loss against. 
Another fact was that the transaction would not fulfil the criteria of being a 
so called “qualified merger” and would not allow the parent company for a 
deduction in accordance with chapter 37 of the Swedish Income Tax Act 
(“SITA”). The reasoning behind the latter was due to the fact that the 
subsidiary was not taxable in Sweden prior to the merger, something which 
is stipulated as a prerequisite in paragraph 11 of stated chapter. However, 
the taxpayer held the legislation incompatible with EU law and that a 
deduction of those losses should, nonetheless, be allowed according to those 
rules, in the same way as would had been done if the subsidiary had been 
established and taxable in Sweden. The Swedish Tax Agency (“STA”) 
agreed that not allowing for the deduction of losses from foreign 
subsidiaries was incompatible with European Union (“EU”) law but that the 
loss must be limited through application of chapter 35 a of the SITA, which 
regards so called intra-group deductions.  
The majority of the BATR (6/9 board members) held that the demand for 
“taxable in Sweden prior to the merger” was proportional and compatible 
                                                
1 See decision of 2016-07-07, the BATR, Advanced Tax Ruling, dnr 30-14/D. 
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with EU law. They argued that since Germany has no rules which allow the 
carry forward of losses through domestic mergers, the taxpayer should have 
no right to deduct the losses, as the losses could not be considered final. The 
majority relied upon previous case law from the Swedish Supreme 
Administrative Court (“SAC”) which states that Sweden should not be 
demanded to heal a flaw in another Member States tax treatment2 and that 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) case K3 proved that 
such limitation in the utilisation of losses is compatible with EU law. 
As tax rulings only need a majority vote to become final the taxpayer was 
disallowed a deduction of the loss. However, the minority of the board 
(accordingly 3/9 board members) still held that the parent company should 
have the right to deduct the losses based on the Marks & Spencer4-doctrine. 
The minority stated that the criteria stipulated in that judgement had been 
fulfilled and that denying a deduction of the loss based only on the treatment 
in Germany was incompatible with EU law and thus, disagreed with the 
interpretation of EU law made by the majority. The decision, which is 
binding for the taxpayer and the STA, has been appealed by both the 
taxpayer and the STA and is now pending before the Swedish SAC. 
To fully understand the complexity and the underlying reasons to the 
decision, the fundamental issues of mergers in general and the specific 
issues related to Sweden must be brought into light.  
1.1.2   Mergers in general and why issues exist in cross border 
situations 
In an international perspective, the term “merger” refers to a transaction 
which combines two businesses by transferring ownership of the businesses 
to a single entity, however, a merger may also be the restructuring of two or 
more companies so they come under a common owner.5 In the process of a 
merger, the dissolved entity or entities are being stripped of their current 
legal personality and loses their right to carry on rights and obligations – 
rights which then, taking Sweden as an example, are carried forward by the 
successors.6 From a tax perspective the loss of legal personality also lead to 
the loss of rights for states to impose taxes on the entity being dissolved in 
the merger, as the assets, on which taxes are levied, are no longer 
attributable to the formerly existing legal entity. 
                                                
2 See, RÅ 2009 ref. 13-15. 
3 Judgement of 7 November 2013, K, C-322/11, EU:C:2013:716. 
4 Judgement of 13 December 2005, Marks & Spencer, C-446/03, EU:C:2005:763. 
5 See explanation, "merger, n.1." OED Online. Oxford University Press, March 2017. Web. 
3 June 2017. 
6 See for instance, ABL 23:34. 
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As stated, problems with mergers arise in connection to the change of 
ownership of either a company, or the assets of a company. From the tax 
perspective, some of the issues of mergers can be deduced from rulings, for 
instance in the CJEU. These amount to, apart from (1) the loss of legal 
personality by one or more of the entities involved, issues connected to (2) 
the valuations of the transferred assets and/or entities, (3) the potential 
continuity of the tax burden or (4) related to the abuse of law, that is, if the 
merger is carried out without commercial reasons.7 
In addition to this, issues arise in cross border situations as the parties to the 
cross border activity then resides in different jurisdictions. Then, two or 
more states might claim rights to tax the same assets. Disparities between 
legal orders and inconsistent application of rules can also lead to assets 
being taxed twice or not at all.8  As there is no common exhaustive 
international legal order for neither legal ownership nor the taxation of 
businesses, rules are in principle determined by each jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, in cross border mergers one state might not just lose their right 
to tax the entity further on, but they might lose their right to tax what would 
have been fully taxable in their jurisdiction prior to the merger.9 
The issues of mergers from a tax perspective can be described through the 
following scenarios; 
Scenario 1. 
Two companies exist in this scenario. Company X in country A and 
company Y, a wholly owned subsidiary of X, who also resides in country A. 
Both companies are recognised by their domestic law as legal personalities 
with the right to carry on rights and obligations. They are also subject to tax 
in their tax jurisdiction, thus company X and Y will be taxed in country A. 
Domestic rules apply accordingly. 
The management of company X has decided to merge company Y into 
company X (thus becoming XY). After the merger company Y will cease to 
exist and will be stripped of its legal personality and, from a legal 
perspective, there will no longer be any tax subject called ”Y”. Instead the 
only legal personality subject to tax further on, will be X as it has absorbed 
Y (XY). 
As no cross border element is existing in this scenario, the merger will be a 
domestic issue for country A. Tax issues that arise in this context can for 
instance be connected to valuations and tax continuity. Tax continuity in 
regards to mergers relates to when the acquiring company, who absorbs the 
dissolved company, also takes on the tax position of its predecessor. When 
                                                
7 See for instance, Judgement of 21 February 2013, A OY, C-123/11, EU:C:2013:84. 
8 See for instance, C-446/03, Marks & Spencer. 
9 Compare a merger to the shift of tax residency in Judgement of 29 November 2011, 
National Grid Indus, C-371/10, EU:C:2011:785. 
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criteria for tax continuity are met, tax that would normally be due on, for 
instance the untaxed value of the acquired shares, is postponed until a later 
point in time. This is also known as a deferral of taxes.10 
Nevertheless, the treatment of domestic mergers is in principle not a 
problem in an international context as international legislations such as, for 
instance EU law, or legal acts as double tax treaties, only regulate cross 
border situations. Thus, not a problem to be solved by neither bilateral 
agreements nor EU law. Furthermore, from a state perspective, there is a 
symmetry in this scenario taking into account for both profits and losses. 
However, in the second scenario we include a cross border element; 
Scenario 2. 
Three companies exist in this scenario. Apart from company X and Y in 
country A, being structured the same way as above, there is now a third 
company ”Z” as well. Z is also a wholly owned subsidiary of X. However, it 
resides in country B. All companies are once again recognised by their 
domestic laws as legal personalities with the right to carry on rights and 
obligations. They are also subject to tax in their tax jurisdiction. 
The management in company X has decided that the subsidiaries Y and Z 
should be merged into the parent company X. 
Through the merger the companies Y and Z will become part of company X 
and lose their legal personalities, and in turn they can no longer carry on any 
rights or obligations. They also lose their personalities as taxable subjects. 
The merger between X and Y will be the same as in scenario 1. 
However, the suggested merger will lead to a situation where country B 
becomes deprived of its right to tax the assets of company Z further on. In a 
scenario where company Z carries on profits or losses at the moment of the 
merger, the symmetric treatment of the profits and losses in country B is 
broken. A deferral of the taxes in company Z would mean that country B 
would lose out on taxing any untaxed assets in company Z, which country B 
would have had to the right to tax, had company Z continued to exist there. 
Thus, country B might want to safeguard their right to tax the untaxed 
values. In most cases this is done by a so called exit tax which essentially 
protects the domestic tax base and makes sure that country B is granted the 
right to the taxation of untaxed gains even though the gain is not realised.11 
Untaxed gains are, as essentially stated, most often the inherent increased 
value of an asset or entity. This connection exists as most states consider 
that this untaxed value should be attributable to their state because of the 
                                                
10 See explanation, "defer, v.1." OED Online. Oxford University Press, March 2017. Web. 
3 June 2017 (subsection 2(a)). 
11 See case C-371/10, National Grid Indus. 
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operations carried out in their jurisdiction giving rise to that increase in 
value.12 
At the same time, if country B applies an exit tax, issues regarding country 
A’s right to tax the same assets in the jurisdiction of A could arise, if 
country A does not recognise the treatment of country B. This could for 
instance lead to double or non-taxation of gains on the same asset. 
Nevertheless, there are also situations relating to the opposite scenario, 
being when company Z carries on losses. In that situation, country A can be 
the one that tries to establish limits to the recognition of such losses and 
might want to protect their tax base as that country would be the one loosing 
out on tax revenue if A fully accept to take the loss of the inherited company 
into account in the jurisdiction of A.13 Allowing for the deduction of the 
losses in Z would, thus, lead to the symmetry between profits and losses 
being broken once again just as for exit taxes. Those scenarios must not 
only entail actual losses, but can also include the overtaking of debts or 
assets and the right to deduct decreasing or increasing values on those assets 
and debts. 
Evidently, cross border mergers can create problems for both taxpayers and 
states. In Sweden, taxation is carried out on a global basis, nevertheless, a 
subsidiary abroad is an establishment over which Sweden has no taxing 
powers as it not registered in Sweden.14 Thus, Sweden have no rights to take 
on the profits of a foreign subsidiary and, evidently, Sweden will be 
reluctant to take on the losses of the same company, as that would lead to an 
asymmetric treatment of profits and losses. Looking back at the decision 
from the BATR, it becomes apparent why the state wants to limit the 
deduction and protect their tax basis, as the loss did not arise in Sweden. 
However, one may then ask the question of why there is a problem in 
Sweden related to a German subsidiary. 
1.1.3   Mergers in Sweden and the effects of EU law 
Through the entry into the EU in 1995, Sweden gave up some of its’ 
sovereignty in exchange for access to the internal market. By entering into 
the Union, Sweden also had to accept that Swedish laws must align with the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). Thus, the 
TFEU is the primer legal act in Sweden. 
                                                
12 Compare to, for instance, Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164, of 12 July 2016 laying 
down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal 
market, (the ”ATAD”), preamble, paragraph 10 
13 See for instance, Judgement of 3 February 2015, Commission vs UK, C-172/13, 
EU:C:2015:50. 
14 See chapter 6, paragraphs 3 & 4 of the SITA. 
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Furthermore, at the time, several directives had already been implemented in 
the EU, one of them being the Merger Directive (“MD”)15, and Sweden was 
obliged to transpose that directive into the Swedish legislation. The purpose 
of the MD is to make it easier for companies to restructure themselves 
within the EU, limiting the tax consequences,16 this is done by postponing 
the moment of when untaxed gains are to be taxed.17 
In Sweden, this implementation lead to the current Swedish legislation 
regarding mergers, which can be found in chapter 37 of the SITA. These 
rules did not exist prior to the implementation of the MD and the rules are 
based on the scope and definitions found in the directive.18 Prior to the 
implementation of these rules the Swedish rules on mergers were also much 
less developed in general.19 Especially, the rules were underdeveloped in 
regard to mergers through so called absorptions, and the introduction of the 
MD required a broadening of the scope of those rules, both in regards to 
civil law as well as tax law.20 Furthermore, the introduction of the MD, and 
also the introduction of new civil law rules, opened up the possibility of 
entering into cross border mergers, something which was impossible 
before.21 
Based on this, it would seem to the reader that mergers were a completely 
new phenomenon to Sweden, however, that is not the entire picture. In 
Sweden, as will be further shown below, the tax legislation allows groups of 
companies to apply rules which essentially means that mergers between 
associated companies can be carried out without tax consequences.22 
Furthermore, Sweden also has rules which enables companies an unlimited 
so called carry-forward of losses, which means that tax losses from previous 
years can be utilised for tax purposes in forthcoming fiscal years.23 These 
sets of rules in combination create a possibility for transactions equivalent to 
mergers and a system of almost unlimited loss utilisation within company 
groups. 
Thus, Sweden introduced rules regarding mergers in addition to already 
existing rules on intra-group contributions, which, in essence, can be used to 
                                                
15 See Council Directive (EU) 2009/133/EC of 19 October 2009 on the common system of 
taxation applicable to mergers, divisions, partial divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges 
of shares concerning companies of different Member States and to the transfer of the 
registered office of an SE or SCE between Member States 
16 See Merger Directive, Council Directive (EU) 2009/133/EC, preamble paragraph (2) 
17 Ibid., preamble paragraph 7. 
18 Compare, SITA 37:3 & 5 to Merger Directive, Council Directive (EU) 2009/133/EC, 
article 2. 
19 See, Ståhl, K, Fusiondirektivet, Svensk Beskattning i EG-rättslig belysning, p.41-42. 
20 Ibid., p.41-42. 
21 See ABL 23:36, introduced based on Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 October 2005 on cross-border mergers of limited liability 
companies. 
22 See chapter 35 of the SITA 
23 SITA chapter 40 regarding, ”Tidigare års underskott” 
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serve the same purpose. As such, these rules are in practise targeting the 
same situations but still co-exist as two different parts of the Swedish tax 
legislation.  
Going back to EU law, the TFEU stipulates through the freedom articles, 
that equal treatment shall apply between nationals of the different Member 
States.24 Thus, a national of one Member State should not be treated worse 
than a national of another. This includes that it is incompatible with EU law 
to apply different rules to what is known as “comparable situations”, or 
applying the same rules to “non-comparable” i.e. different situations.25 
Thus, EU law essentially requires Member States to enact tax rules which 
do not create a difference in treatment between domestic and foreign 
taxpayers.  
This is where the issues of the Swedish rules start. The Swedish rules on 
group taxation are only applicable to companies with tax residency in 
Sweden. Thus, these rules create a difference in treatment between 
taxpayers established in Sweden compared to taxpayers established in 
another Member State, something, which, in principle, is prohibited by the 
TFEU and thus, perhaps make these rules incompatible with EU law. 
Looking back at the decision from the BATR, the taxpayer argues for an 
application of the same rules as would have been applied domestically, 
despite the fact that the subsidiary is established in Germany which 
accordingly should be the case if the rules are incompatible with EU law. 
However, the reader might then ask why these rules should govern the cross 
border merger, when rules regarding cross border merger exist through the 
implementation of the MD. Since the Swedish intra-group contribution rules 
apply to the same situations as the merger rules, it seems, from the decision 
from the BATR, as if the the rules also practically apply as part of one set of 
rules. Furthermore, as will also be shown below, apart from the factual 
issues of the case, the way the Swedish merger rules have been 
implemented, make them virtually impossible for foreign subsidiaries to 
access. It is, however, uncertain whether such de facto difference in 
treatment, in regards to the implemented rules, is compatible with EU law. 
Nevertheless, the nationality restriction in the rules on the Swedish group 
taxation rules has led to the implementation of the rules regarding intra-
group deductions. This legislation was enacted in response to the Marks & 
Spencer-ruling26 of the CJEU, known as the start of the final loss-doctrine, 
and the rules makes it possible to deduct a loss in a foreign subsidiary if it is 
considered to be “final” in accordance with that legislation. However, these 
                                                
24 See for instance, Freedom of Establishment, art. 49 of TFEU 
25 See for instance Judgement of 14 February 1995, Schumacker, C-279/93, EU:C:1995:31, 
paragraph 30. 
26 Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer 
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rules are limited in several ways and it is not evident that these rules are 
themselves compatible with EU law either.  
Evidently, from a Swedish perspective, dealing with cross border mergers 
means not just dealing with the merger legislation in itself, but also rules 
regarding intra-group contributions and intra-group deductions. The three 
sets of rules practically apply to the same situations and therefore, based on 
the fact that they treat foreign situations differently in comparison to 
domestic ones, the rules can be questioned on their compatibility with EU 
law, either as separate legislations or taken as a whole. 
1.2   Aims and question of the thesis  
The aim of the thesis is to find out whether the Swedish merger legislation 
as a whole is compatible with EU law. The question of the thesis can be 
phrased as; What are the criteria and limitations of EU law in connection to 
national laws on loss relief in the context of cross border mergers between 
Member State of the EU and is the Swedish legislation compatible with 
these criteria?  
The aim is to do this by comparing the law as it stands in Sweden to the law 
as it stands in EU law. More specifically, the aim is to provide for an 
analysis of the framework and the limits of the principles set out in the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU in connection to cross border mergers. 
Furthermore, based on the conclusions drawn in the analysis, it is the aim of 
the author to provide for a qualified and valid comment on how the Swedish 
SAC should settle the pending case regarding a cross border merger 
between Sweden and Germany. The aim is also to provide for a proposal on 
how the Swedish legislation could be amended. 
1.3   Method and material  
The material in this thesis was updated till 1 June 2017. 
As the thesis is trying to establish whether the Swedish legislation is 
compatible with EU law, the method used in the thesis is the legal dogmatic 
research method. The legal dogmatic research method tries to establish the 
law as it stands from a positivist normative perspective by applying written 
15 
 
and unwritten rules, principles, concepts, case law, doctrines and literature.27 
It can be said that the method essentially tries to establish how the law 
should be applied rather than describing how the law is actually applied. As 
the thesis involve both Swedish law as well as EU law, it is fundamental for 
the reader to get acquainted with the law as it stands both in Sweden and in 
the EU. The jurisdictions have different legal sources as well as different 
hierarchies for those sources which means that the sources will be different. 
Nevertheless, the sources are handled the same way as the method suggests, 
by identifying the sources, by analysing them, by systemizing them and 
lastly by confronting them with each other in an academic way.28 
In the background, references are made to the case law of the CJEU and the 
ATAD, despite talking about mergers internationally. The author’s reason 
behind this was to support the explanation regarding mergers with empirical 
evidence of some kind, without obliging the author to conduct an empirical 
study of its own. 
In the presentation of the Swedish law, it becomes necessary to provide for 
a translation of the Swedish legal sources. The translations of the Swedish 
sources are the author’s own, which can entail small discrepancies in the 
language between English and Swedish and could in some cases mean that 
there is a more accepted translation. The primer source of law in Sweden is 
the legislation which is thus the starting point. In addition to the written law 
the rulings from the SAC are deemed to have the second highest value in the 
legal hierarchy together with the preparatory works carried out when 
stipulating laws. However, case law from the SAC always supersede if the 
two sources collide. Nevertheless, the preparatory works are important in 
Sweden as they provide for a wide background to why the laws were 
enacted. Therefore, it is natural to use them as part of the explanation. Last 
in the Swedish hierarchy are the publications by legal researchers and other 
legal publications, such as official statements from the STA. In connection 
to this, the Swedish law also allows for so called Advanced Tax Rulings 
(“ATR”). An ATR is a legally binding decision between a taxpayer and the 
STA which is decided by a board of tax experts known as the BATR. An 
advanced ruling does however have no jurisprudential status, nor any higher 
legal status than academic publications or an official statement from the 
STA. Nonetheless, both ATRs and the STA statements have a lot of 
practical value which makes them interesting to analyse.29 
In the parts regarding EU law it is natural to start in the TFEU as that is the 
primer legal source in the EU. In connection to this it is also natural to look 
                                                
27 Vranken in Douma, S, Legal Research in International and EU Tax Law, Kluwer, 2014, 
p. 18 
28 Douma, S, Legal Research in International and EU Tax Law, Kluwer, 2014, p. 20. 
29 Explanation to the Swedish legal hierarchy can be found in for instance, Sandgren, Claes, 
2006, Rättsvetenskap för uppsatsförfattare 
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at the case law of the CJEU as the court is the ultimate interpreter of EU 
law.30 The cases that has been chosen for the analysis are the ones that are 
either referred to the most in other cases of the CJEU or in doctrinal articles. 
The choices have also been influenced by the materials dealt with during the 
Masters programme. In addition to the case law of the CJEU the thesis deals 
with opinions of the Advocate Generals (“AG”) as well as doctrinal 
publications. The opinions of the AGs, which are not binding for any part 
but merely guidance and have the same legal status as legal research, have 
been used to provide for a background to cases or to enhance the 
argumentations both in the description of the law as it stands as well as the 
analysis of the author. The opinions of the AGs are useful for that purpose 
as they often develop around concept and principles or provide for a wider 
context than rulings in the CJEU. The legal research articles used to 
complement the reasoning of both the CJEU and to enhance the authors own 
arguments are articles written primarily by scholars and published in the 
most recognised legal papers in the EU as well the most recognised legal 
papers in Sweden.  
Furthermore, due to objectivity reasons the author has refrained from using 
any source which could be affected by personal agendas. 
1.4   Delimitations 
The thesis will only be looking at the Swedish rules and thus analyse the 
criteria and distinctions made in the Swedish law and compare it to EU law. 
The thesis will be looking at the issues regarding merger from a perspective 
where Sweden is the state of residence. Issues relating to source taxation, 
such as exit taxes can some times be commented shortly but without any 
analysis. The main reason for this is because the author believes that the 
Swedish exit tax rules, in general, comply with the criteria stipulated in the 
case law of the CJEU (perhaps with minor adjustments). The Swedish exit 
tax rules also seem to be in line with the criteria in the ATAD, which means 
that even after an adoption of that directive, the rules would persevere. In 
connection to this, mergers between standalone companies have been left 
outside the thesis and the thesis will primarily deal with affiliated 
companies. The reason behind this is, if companies in Sweden do not meet 
the requirements for tax consolidation, exit taxes apply even domestically. 
Thus, making these rules less interesting to analyse from an EU law 
compatibility perspective.  
                                                
30 See for instance TFEU art. 263 
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Furthermore, the Swedish merger rules contain several technicalities and it 
is possible that other parts of the intra-group contribution legislation contain 
issues related to the EU compatibility. However, these issues will not be 
dealt with due to the extent of thesis and as the latest decision from the 
BATR pending before the SAC are connected to valuation of losses and the 
recognition of the laws in other Member States those seemed to be the most 
interesting topics to write about. 
In the analysis of EU law, the thesis is limited to the fundamental freedoms 
and in part the MD. At the start of the thesis, it was the aim of the author to 
provide for a discussion regarding issues in connection to the Swedish 
application of the directive. However, the discussion regarding the MD will 
be very limited. This is due to, as will be shown below, that in practise, 
Sweden does not apply the rules of the directive. In addition to this, as the 
Swedish “final loss-rules” apply instead, it is to be noticed that several 
authors have already written academic articles in regards to the final loss-
doctrine of the CJEU.31 However, the Swedish application of this doctrine is 
not dealt with in those publications and therefore still an interesting topic to 
write about. 
Potential State Aid issues are also left outside of the discussion found in the 
thesis despite that being part of EU primary law.  
Furthermore, tax treaties are an integral part of the sphere of international 
taxation and even though Sweden as well as many other EU countries have 
committed to such agreements they are not directly part of EU law and for 
the most part left outside of the thesis.  
1.5   Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis will continue in part 2 by a more detailed description of the 
Swedish laws applicable in cross border merger, as to provide for a 
benchmark to compare to EU law. In part 3 the author first analyses whether 
the Swedish rules amount to a discrimination or a restriction of EU law. 
Then the author goes on to analyse the potential justifications of such 
discrimination or restriction. The proportionality of the potential 
justification is discussed in part 4. Lastly, the thesis is summarized and 
conclusions are drawn in part 5. 
                                                
31 See for instance, Lang. M, Has the Case Law of the ECJ on Final Losses Reached the 
End of the Line?,  2014, European Taxation or Danish, M, What remains of the Marks and 
Spencer Exception for Final Losses? – Examining the Impact of Commission v. United 
Kingdom (Case C-172/13), 2015, European Taxation 
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In some parts an analysis of the Swedish rules and/or application of the law 
will be drawn directly in connection to the descriptive text, while in some 
parts the Swedish legislation is being analysed in a subchapter of its own. 
This distinction if primarily drawn on the relevance of that chapter for the 
overall aim of the thesis. 
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2   The Swedish rules 
2.1   The Swedish rules on cross border mergers 
2.1.1   Qualified and unqualified mergers  
It was previously stated that the Swedish rules regarding mergers are based 
on the MD, these rules are found in chapter 37 of the SITA. In Sweden, 
mergers are split into two classifications. First there are the so called 
”qualified mergers”, which in short can be explained as the mergers which 
fulfils the criteria set out in the MD. When these rules apply, tax continuity 
applies and no capital gains tax normally due will be subject to taxation 
until a later point in time. The transferee also takes on the position of the 
transferor regarding the value of assets and obligations.32 However, these 
tax rules are limited to domestic as well as cross border mergers within the 
EU/European Economic Area (“EEA”).33 Secondly, mergers which do not 
fulfil the criteria of the MD are a contrario called ”unqualified mergers”.34  
The rules apply either when a Swedish company is the transferor i.e. the 
company being dissolved or the transferee i.e. the company absorbing the 
transferred company.35 The transferor must prior to the merger be taxable in 
whole or in part and, the transferee must, immediately after the merger, be 
fully taxable.36 
Furthermore, the requirements for the transferor to take part in a qualified 
merger are stated as being, “in part taxable” and that “the income cannot in 
its entirety be tax free according to a tax treaty”.37 According to Andersson 
M. et Al.38 the paragraph must be read as “taxable according to the SITA”.39 
Even though the wording of the legislation stipulates no such demand, the 
same statement can be found in the preparatory works to the first 
                                                
32 See SITA 37:17 & 18 
33 See SITA 37:4 with reference to paragraphs 11-15 in the same chapter. 
34 See SITA 37:4, a contrario. 
35 See SITA 37:11 and SITA 37:12. 
36 See SITA 37:11 & 12 
37  See SITA 37:11. 
38 Mari Andersson, Judge of the Swedish SAC, Anita Saldén Enérus, Judge of the Swedish 
SAC & Ulf Tivéus, tax professional at Skeppsbron Skatt. 
39 See Andersson, M, et. Al., 2017, Inkomstskattelagen – en kommentar, commentary on 
chapter 37, paragraphs 11 & 12. 
20 
 
introduction of the merger rules40 and in preparatory works to the 
amendment of the Swedish tax legislation.41 Thus, a merger can only take 
place if the transferor is in part taxable according to the SITA. In turn, a 
company established in another Member State, for instance a subsidiary of a 
Swedish parent, would need to be taxable in Sweden, for example, through a 
Permanent Establishment (“PE”) to fulfil that criterion. If that is not the 
case, a subsidiary cannot be part in a qualified merger according to the 
implemented Swedish rules. As a consequence, the Swedish implementation 
essentially requires the transferor to be established in Sweden. 
The Swedish Board for Advanced Rulings held, in 2008, that the Swedish 
implemented legislation constituted a restriction of the freedom of 
establishment. Furthermore, the board believed that the restriction would be 
hard to justify.42 However, even though the ruling was appealed to the SAC, 
it was decided without the SAC neither requesting a preliminary ruling from 
the CJEU nor without a publishing of the decision. As the question has not 
been appealed since, there is no Swedish jurisprudence to rely on regarding 
how Sweden actually applies the provision.43 Without any further 
jurisprudence, the part taxable according to the SITA must be considered to 
be the law as it stands. Thus, a cross border merger cannot be treated as 
qualified if the transferor is established abroad without being at least in part 
taxable in Sweden. In practise making almost all cross border mergers fall 
short of the qualification.  
In the cases of mergers which do not fulfil the criteria for tax continuity, the 
adopted rules of the MD are, thus, inapplicable and instead the taxation of 
these mergers are to be determined based on the general domestic rules for 
company taxation. These “unqualified mergers” include domestic, as well as 
cross border mergers and the rules regarding intra-group contributions and 
intra-group deductions apply to those merger per analogy. This is because of 
the fact, as we saw in the previous chapter, that a merger between two 
domestic companies can be carried out without actual tax consequences 
even if the merger falls out of the criteria in the MD, if these rules become 
applicable. 
2.2   Intra-group contributions 
Companies in Sweden are standalone entities for tax purposes. However, to 
simplify the tax treatment of company groups, Sweden applies a tax 
                                                
40 See Prop. 1998/99:15, p. 221.  
41 See Prop. 1999/2000:2, part 2, p.434. 
42 See decision of 2008-01-28, the BATR, Advanced Tax Ruling, dnr 26-07/D. 
43 See The SAC, judgement number 7565-08. 
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consolidation regime, found in chapter 35 of the SITA, with the purpose to 
reduce the tax liabilities for a company group to the same level as 
standalone entities.44 For the rules to apply a parent company must own 
more than 90% of the shares in a subsidiary.45 Thus, it only applies to 
companies where the parent company exercises a definite influence over the 
subsidiary.  
The consolidation regime works in such a way that groups of companies, 
which fulfil the criteria for the consolidation regime, can make contributions 
between affiliated companies in the group. These contributions are 
considered deductible for tax purposes for the payer and considered taxable 
income for the payee.46 As such a loss in one group company can be utilized 
by way of transferring profits, or rather income, from the income making 
affiliated company to an affiliated company carrying a loss. Furthermore, an 
actual loss or gain is not necessary to fulfil the criteria of sending an intra-
group contribution as there is nothing in the legislation that puts limits on 
the contributions. Thus, a contribution can be sent from one company to 
another even if it creates a loss in the first company.47 Even though the rules 
primarily target a parent-subsidiary situation, contributions can also be sent 
between subsidiaries of the same parent, as if it would have been sent 
through the parent.48 Mergers are also treated as an intra-group contribution 
leading to a merger with no tax consequences if the same criteria are met.49  
The rules regarding intra-group contributions are, as previously stated, only 
applicable to affiliated companies with tax residency in Sweden, or a 
company with tax residency in the EU/EEA who carries on a PE in Sweden 
(intra-group contributions can be sent from a Swedish company to the PE or 
vice versa, when the PE is resident for tax purposes in Sweden). This is due 
to the fact that an intra-group contribution only becomes deductible for the 
payer if the contribution is taxable in Sweden in the hands of the payee.50   
However, in response to the Marks & Spencer and A OY51 rulings in the 
CJEU, where the court, in essence, held that a taxpayer should be able to 
deduct a loss in a subsidiary established abroad which is considered final,52 
                                                
44 See Prop. 1999/2000:2 p.421.  
45 SITA 35:2. 
46 SITA 35:1. 
47 See for instance, The STA, 2017, Vad är ett koncernbidrag? – Rättslig vägledning, 
http://www4.skatteverket.se/rattsligvagledning/edition/2017.3/331639.html?q=koncernbidr
ag (visited 2017-05-03).  
48 SITA 35:6. 
49 SITA 35:5.  
50 SITA 35:3.  
51 See case C-123/11, A OY 
52 Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer, paragraph 59. 
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led to several rulings in the SAC53 and the implementation of the rules 
regarding intra-group deductions.54   
2.3   Intra-group deductions and the right to deduct final 
losses 
The rules regarding intra-group deductions are found in chapter 35 a of the 
SITA and grants a Swedish parent company the right to deduct a final loss 
in a foreign subsidiary if the parent owns more than 90% of the subsidiary 
and the subsidiary is located in the EU/EEA. In regards to the ownership 
these rules, thus, equals the rules regarding intra-group contributions.55  
However, according to the Swedish rules, a loss is not final unless the 
subsidiary have been liquidated and the liquidation procedure have been 
finished.56 It is noticeable that a merger means dissolving a company 
without going into liquidation making these rules inapplicable. Nonetheless, 
the STA has published an official statement, stating that in practise the rules 
regarding final losses shall apply by analogy to mergers the same way as 
they apply to companies going into liquidation.57 Thus, the rules on final 
losses are practically available in mergers, despite the lack of representation 
in the legislation. 
A loss is final when a loss cannot be utilised in the subsidiary or ”another” 
in the state of the subsidiary and the reason that it cannot be utilised is not 
based on their being a de jure-limitation in the usage of such loss nor that 
this loss usage is limited in time.58  
The rules are also further restricted by limiting the deduction to the lowest 
amount that would be concluded based on the calculation in both the 
involved states and up to a maximum of the profits made by the parent 
company.59  
Based on this, it can be noticed that the Swedish merger rules, apart from 
putting limits on the loss utilisation of foreign subsidiaries, also put foreign 
subsidiaries in a situation where they can never be treated better than 
Swedish subsidiaries, but can be treated worse. 
                                                
53 See among others, Rå. 2009 ref. 13 
54 See Prop. 2009/10:194, p. 2 
55 See part 2.3. 
56 SITA 35 a: 5 (1). 
57 The STA official statement, Avdragsrätt för slutlig förlust hos överlåtande företag vid 
gränsöverskridande fusion, Dnr: 131 422133-13/111. 
58 SITA 35 a: 6.  
59 SITA 35 a: 7. 
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2.4   Summary of the Swedish law as it stands 
In Sweden mergers were introduced at the adoption of the MD and the term 
was divided into two classifications. A qualified merger is a merger where 
the criteria set out in the MD and the transposed Swedish legislation are 
fulfilled. In those situations, tax continuity is applied. However, the criteria 
practically eliminate foreign subsidiaries from the rules. This is because the 
transposed Swedish rules are limited to subsidiaries who are, at least in part, 
taxable in Sweden. Mergers which do not meet the criteria of being 
qualified become unqualified mergers.  
Unqualified mergers are mergers where the general business taxation 
scheme applies rules regarding intra-group contribution apply. In connection 
to this set of rules the rules regarding intra-group deductions apply. These 
rules were invented to comply with EU law as the rules regarding intra-
group contributions do not apply to companies established outside of 
Sweden.  
The rules regarding intra-group deductions allows for the deduction of final 
losses. Even though the Swedish legislation does not apply to mergers per 
se, the Swedish authorities applies these rules to merger per analogy. 
However, for a loss to be final it must fulfil certain criteria and the 
deduction cannot exceed the profits in the parent company. 
Thus, to be able to determine whether the Swedish rules can be deemed 
compatible with the TFEU, it must be analysed where EU law sets its’ limits 
in regards to cross border mergers, domestic tax consolidation systems as 
well as for final losses. 
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3   Treaty Access and Justifications 
3.1   Access to the Applicable Freedoms and whether a 
discrimination or restriction exists 
3.1.1   TFEU or the Merger Directive 
Before a complete analysis of the compatibility of the Swedish merger rules 
with EU law can take place, it must be ascertained whether the rules should 
be analysed in the light of the fundamental freedoms or in the light of the 
Merger Directive from which the rules have been adopted.  
In the judgement Euro Park Service60 the CJEU stated how to draw a 
distinction between these two legal acts. The case regarded the anti-
shopping clause in the MD, which had been transposed by France into their 
domestic tax law. The first question of the case regarded whether a 
provision, adopted based on a directive, should be analysed in the light of 
the directive or primary law i.e. the TFEU and the fundamental freedoms 
therein. The court stated that ”any national measure in an area which has 
been the subject of exhaustive harmonisation at the level of the European 
Union must be assessed in the light of the provisions of that harmonising 
measure, and not in the light of the provisions of primary law”.61  
However, the court went on to state that said provision in the directive was 
part of no such exhaustive harmonisation. Furthermore, when no further 
guidance on the implementation of a directive provision exists, the state 
should, taking into account the principle of proportionality, determine how 
to adopt the provision for the purposes of applying the article in the 
directive. The court also stated, that when such legislation is not part of an 
exhaustively harmonized area the provision comes into the scope of the 
fundamental freedoms of the TFEU.62  
AG Kokott clarifies the meaning of exhaustively harmonized in her opinion 
on Holcim.63 She states, in essence, that when a measure neither obliges 
Member States to introduce the specific measure, nor defines any exhaustive 
                                                
60 Judgment of 8 March 2017, Euro Park Service, C-14/16, EU:C:2017:177. 
61 Ibid., paragraph 19. 
62 Ibid., paragraphs 24-26. 
63 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 19 January 2017, Eqiom and Enka – 
“Holcim”, C-6/16, EU:C:2017:34. 
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objective to interpret against, then a rule is not part of such an exhaustive 
harmonized area.64 
As the Swedish rules regarding qualified mergers are based on the MD, it 
would, therefore, seem correct to compare them to the provision of that 
directive. The criterion under scrutiny is “taxable according to the SITA” 
found in 37:11 of the SITA, and the only equivalent article in the directive is 
article 3, which states that “a company, according to the directive, is a 
company which is resident for tax purposes within a Member State 
according to the laws of that Member  State”.65 It is evident that the Swedish 
criterion is not compatible with that provision of the directive and it could 
also be argued that said article could constitute an exhaustively harmonized 
provision. However, it was also stated in Euro Park Service that Member 
States, when adopting directives into national legislation, must rely on the 
principle of proportionality in doing so. As we have also seen from the 
decision in the BATR, the board held that this criterion was proportional 
taking into account the legislation on intra-group contributions and intra-
group deductions. 
In connection to this, the author agrees with the BATR in the conclusion 
that, because of the fact that Sweden essentially have two co-acting merger 
legislations, the rules regarding intra-group contributions and intra-group 
deduction must also be taken into account to properly determine the 
compatibility of the criterion found in 37:11 of the SITA. However, as these 
rules are found in other parts of the Swedish legislation, and, according to 
the author not part of the exhaustive harmonized area of the MD, these rules 
cannot be exclusively scrutinized towards the MD. Thus, the entire merger 
legislation must also be scrutinized in the light of the fundamental freedoms.  
3.1.2   Applicable freedoms and the right to access them 
In order to make an assessment of the Swedish rules compatibility of EU 
law, it must be ascertained whether the legislation falls within the free 
movement articles of the TFEU. There are in particular two freedoms which 
have impact on companies doing business in the EU. The freedom of 
establishment found in art. 49 of the TFEU and the free movement of capital 
found in art. 63 of the TFEU.  
The freedom of establishment mainly protects the equal treatment of foreign 
nationals in the host state. However, the freedom also prohibits the Member 
State of origin hindering establishments in another Member State, thus the 
protection of the freedom applies both to situations where a taxpayer is 
                                                
64 Opinion of AG Kokott, C-6/16, Holcim, paragraph 35 
65 See Merger Directive, Council Directive (EU) 2009/133/EC, article 3 (b).
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hindered in establishing abroad by the state of residence as well as when the 
taxpayer is hindered by rules in the state of the foreign establishment.66 
The free movement of capital, art. 63 TFEU, states that any restriction of the 
movement of capital, and any restrictions to payments, between Member 
States, as well as between Member States and third countries, are 
prohibited. 
Essentially the treaty freedoms stipulate the equal treatment of businesses 
with residency in other states compared to domestically resident businesses 
and the equal treatment of capital movements, in comparison to an 
equivalent domestic capital movement.  
Which freedom that is applicable is in general determined based on what 
freedom that fits the purpose of the legislation the most.67 Determining 
which freedom that applies is of great importance as a very important 
distinction exists between the freedoms. The freedom of establishment 
applies only to situations between two citizens of the EU, while the free 
movement of capital includes situations where one party is a citizen of the 
EU and the other is resident in a state outside the EU.68 
The distinction between the freedoms is also important when it comes to the 
potential justifications of a discriminatory of restrictive legislation. When 
the free movement of capital applies, Member States may apply harsher 
criteria towards residents in third countries, for instance based on securing 
the payment of taxes, than would be possible if the situation would have 
been under scrutiny of the freedom of establishment.69 
When both freedoms can apply to a situation, the CJEU makes a distinction 
between which freedom to apply by looking at whether the legislation 
demands a certain level of influence over the other party. When the 
legislation aims at situation where one company exercises a decisive 
influence over the other, the freedom of establishment applies alone. 70 
As we have seen above, a merger is a particular way of terminating the 
existence of a legal person and when the legal personality is lost, the 
benefits of the treaty is generally lost as well. However, the CJEU has made 
it clear that a merger, no matter the motive, is a necessary method of 
restructuring for companies in the EU and essential for the functioning of 
                                                
66 See for instance, Judgement of 21 December 2016, Masco Damixa, C-593/14, 
EU:C:2016:984, paragraph 24. 
67 See for instance, Judgement of 21 January 2011, Test Claimants in the FII Group 
Litigation 2, C-35/11, EU:C:2012:707 (”FII GLO 2”), paragraph 90. 
68 See for instance, Judgement of 24 November 2016, SECIL, C-464/14, EU:C:2016:896 
paragraph 42. 
69 Ibid. paragraphs 63-64.  
70 Judgement of 12 December 2006, Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, C-446/04, 
EU:C:2006:774 (”FII GLO”), paragraph 37. 
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the internal market.71 Thus, even though a merger dissolves a legal 
personality the merger falls under the protection of the treaty and the 
fundamental freedoms.  
Furthermore, in the same case the CJEU provides for one more important 
distinction regarding mergers. The court states that a merger is essentially 
the opposite to establishing a subsidiary abroad, and as such it is part of a 
taxpayers right to establish itself freely within the EU.72  
3.1.3   Discrimination or restriction 
The next step that must be ascertain is to determine whether the Swedish 
rules cause a discrimination or a restriction. For a restriction or 
discrimination to exist a difference in the treatment of comparable situations 
must exist. As stated earlier, this entails either that the same rules are 
applied to taxpayers in different situations or that different rules are applied 
to the taxpayers in the same situation.73 Furthermore, a discrimination can 
either be direct or indirect. A direct discrimination distinguishes a situation 
based on the nationality of the parties involved. Indirect discrimination 
occurs when a legislation does not at the outskirts treat different nationals 
differently, but where the rules in practise only applies to cross border 
situations. Thus, creating a difference in treatment anyways.74 
In general, the CJEU seems to make no difference between a discriminatory 
legislation or a restrictive legislation even though it is a question being 
debated by scholars.75 Furthermore, the CJEU only looks at one tax subject 
at the time to determine whether a discrimination or restriction exists.76 
However, a restriction to the freedom of establishment has sometimes been 
found even in cases where there is no obvious discrimination. In 
Krankenheim and Deustche Shell there seem to be a combination of the 
treatment of both states which causes the taxpayer to end up in a worse 
situation than a comparable domestic situation. 77 Even when the treatment 
of the Member State of resident is legitimate in itself.78 Johansson discusses 
thoroughly whether Krankenheim creates an obligation for the taxpayers and 
the Member States to analyse the legislation of both Member States 
                                                
71 See for instance, case C-123/11 A OY, paragraph 24. 
72 Ibid., paragraph 25. 
73 See the reference to C-279/93, Schumacker, in part 1.1. 
74 See for instance, C-279/93, Schumacker, paragraph 26. 
75 Johansson, J, 2016, EU-domstolens restriktionsprövning - i mål om de grundläggande 
friheterna och direkta skatter, p. 47. 
76 Ibid., p. 65. 
77 See Judgement of 28 February 2008, Deutsche Shell, C-293/06, EU:C:2008:129 and 
Judgement of 23 October 2008, Krankenheim Ruhesitz, EU:C:2008:588. 
78 Wattel, P, Non-Discrimination á la Cour: The ECJ’s (Lack of) Comparability Analysis in 
Direct Tax Cases, European Taxation, 2015, p. 548. 
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concerned and to take both into account when determining whether a 
restriction exists or not. However, he concludes that there is no possibility to 
draw any such conclusion based on the case as the arguments of the CJEU 
are lacklustre and vague.79 
In Masco Damixa, which was decided after the publishing of Johansson’s 
thesis, the CJEU appears to correct their confusing restriction analysis found 
in Krankenheim in favour of Johansson’s conclusion. The case regarded a 
Danish parent company with a subsidiary in Germany. The subsidiary in 
Germany paid interest on a loan from the Danish parent company, an 
interest payment that was being treated worse for tax purposes than interest 
payments from subsidiaries resident for tax purposes in Denmark. Having 
Krankenheim in mind, the treatment in Germany could, hypothetically, 
affect whether the Danish rules caused a restriction on the freedom of 
establishment or not. However, the court argued that even if the freedom of 
establishment does not oblige Member States to draw up rules that removes 
any disparities between domestic treatments, a different treatment of a 
foreign subsidiary compared to a domestic subsidiary in a comparable 
situation constitutes a restriction no matter the treatment in the other state.80 
Thus, the treatment in Germany was of no importance in the  
restriction/discrimination analysis of the court. Based on this, it is the view 
of the author that the potential misconception found in the previous case law 
is corrected by the court, even though they do not make any explicit 
comment about it.  
Another aspect of the restriction analysis that has been brought into light by 
the CJEU is restriction based on de facto discrimination. In FII GLO and FII 
GLO 2 the CJEU dealt with the British rules regarding cross border 
dividends. In the UK, dividend payments between domestic companies are 
subject to a participation exemption, meaning that they are not deductible 
for the payer nor taxable for the payee. At the same time the UK had 
implemented the PSD81 in such way that taxes on foreign dividends were 
subject to a credit against the corporate tax in the UK, instead of being 
subject to the exemption that was being applied to domestic dividends. At 
the outskirts of the legislation de jure, there seemed to be no difference in 
treatment.  
However, the applicants in the proceeding stated that foreign dividends were 
de facto treated worse than national dividends. One reason for this was that 
even if the domestic company receiving the dividend had no obligation to 
                                                
79 Johansson, J, 2016, EU-domstolens restriktionsprövning - i mål om de grundläggande 
friheterna och direkta skatter, p. 170-171. 
80 See C-593/14, Masco Damixa, paragraphs 40-43. 
81 See Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 November 2011 on the common system of 
taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member 
States. 
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pay corporate income tax, the dividend would still be subject to the 
participation exemption and, thus, ”tax free”.82 In the equivalent situation 
with a foreign subsidiary the tax free company would have no corporate tax 
to offset the foreign tax against. Thus, leading to a de facto worse treatment 
for foreign dividends.  
The CJEU stated that when the receivers of domestic and foreign dividends 
are in comparable situations an effective i.e. de facto difference in treatment 
constitutes a restriction incompatible with EU law.83 The only time such 
treatment did not amount to a restriction was if the situations at hand were 
ancillary. Thus, when determining whether a restriction or discrimination 
exists both the legislation itself as well as the application of the legislation 
must be analysed. 
3.1.4   Whether the Swedish rules create a restriction on the 
fundamental freedoms 
A taxpayer exercising its right to carry out a cross border merger is despite 
the loss of legal personality of one of the involved parties, protected by the 
free movement articles. From the Swedish perspective, there is also but one 
exercise of the treaty freedoms, that being the establishment abroad. As seen 
in A OY described in part 3.1.2, merging a subsidiary is considered part of 
the same treaty exercise as establishing abroad. Thus, when a Swedish 
parent company establishes a foreign subsidiary, which is then subsequently 
merged, the parent company is the one exercising their treaty rights. 
According to the author this entails that the restriction analysis must also be 
based on the view of parent.  
When a Swedish parent company establishes a subsidiary the merger rules, 
the rules regarding intra-group contributions and intra-group deduction 
apply together. These rules require the parent company to own more than 
90% of the shares in the subsidiary to be applicable. Such threshold must be 
deemed to pass the decisive or definite influence test set out by the CJEU in 
determining which freedom that should apply. A merger is also part of the 
same treaty exercise as establishing abroad and by also adding the treatment 
of the taxpayer in A OY, where equivalent rules for tax consolidation were 
under scrutiny for restricting the freedom of establishment, it can be 
concluded that the rules fall within said freedom.  
In connection to this, it is true that in A OY the CJEU stated that rules 
separating taxpayer based on their residency can sometimes justify a 
difference in treatment. However, the court also stated, that if all rules could 
                                                
82 See C-35/11, FII GLO 2, paragraph 41. 
83 Ibid., paragraphs 50-54. 
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be justified based on residency, it would deprive the freedom of 
establishment of its value.84 Furthermore, the court also stated, that allowing 
a parent company to merge with a domestic subsidiary with tax continuity, 
but not allowing for the same treatment of foreign subsidiaries constituted a 
restriction as a parent company merging with a foreign subsidiary was in an 
objectively comparable situation to a parent company merging with a 
foreign subsidiary. Such difference in treatment did, therefore, infringe the 
freedom.85   
Thus, in the analysis of whether the rules create a discrimination or 
restriction, the author believes the Swedish rules create an indirect 
restriction on the freedom of establishment in the following ways: 
First, a Swedish parent company is excluded from the possibility of merging 
a foreign subsidiary into the Swedish business with tax continuity unless the 
subsidiary also carries on a PE in Sweden prior to the merger. No such 
limits exist for Swedish subsidiaries.  
Secondly, when a merger is unqualified the rules regarding intra-group 
contributions and intra-group deductions apply. The intra-group 
contribution rules require both parties to be taxable in Sweden and Swedish 
subsidiaries are not at all targeted by the rules regarding intra-group 
deductions.  
The rules regarding intra-group deductions also stipulate that when 
calculating the deductible amount only the lowest value accounted for by 
the Swedish and the foreign legislation should be chosen. The deduction can 
also not exceed the profits of the parent company. These limitations amount 
to a de facto difference in treatment as domestic subsidiaries have no limits 
in their deduction. 
All of those restrictions makes it less attractive to establish a subsidiary in 
another Member State in comparison to establishing it in Sweden. 
Consequently, it can be concluded that the Swedish merger rules, the intra-
group contribution rules as well as the rules regarding final losses, 
separately as well as together, creates restrictions to the freedom of 
establishment.  
Thus for the Swedish rules to be compatible with EU law, the rules must 
pursue a legitimate objective and they must be justified by an overriding 
reason in the public interest.86  
                                                
84 See C-123/11, A OY, paragraph 34. 
85 Ibid., paragraph 35. 
86 See for instance case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer, paragraph 35. 
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3.2   Justifications 
3.2.1   Justifications in general 
A restriction or discrimination found in domestic legislations can be deemed 
compatible with EU law if the restriction or discrimination can be justified. 
As seen above, there is a distinction between the justification of direct and 
indirect discriminations. Direct discrimination based on nationality can only 
be justified based on public policies, public health or public security87, while 
indirect discrimination or restrictions can be justified by overriding reasons 
in the public interest.88 The CJEU also allows for the application of several 
justifications at the same time.89 
3.2.2   Cohesion of the tax system 
The first justification found in the case law of the CJEU is “the cohesion of 
the tax system”. The justification, which was stipulated in the Bachmann-
ruling90, tries to ensure that there is a symmetric tax treatment within one 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, for a legislation to be justified based on the 
cohesion of the tax system, said justification requires a direct link between a 
tax advantage and the offsetting of that advantage through a tax levy.91 
However, a legislation which leads to the existence of such a direct link 
only in regards to cross border situations cannot, nevertheless, be justified.92 
3.2.3   Balanced allocation of taxing rights 
The second justification method called the ”balanced allocation of taxing 
rights” was introduced by the CJEU in the previously mentioned Marks & 
Spencer-ruling. In the case the CJEU stated that profits and losses must be 
treated symmetrically in the same tax system. This is in order to protect a 
balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between different Member 
States.93 Furthermore, the CJEU acknowledge that the preservation of that 
allocation might make it necessary to apply the tax rules of only one state in 
                                                
87 See for instance TFEU art. 45(3). 
88 See for instance case C-123/11, A OY, paragraph 33. 
89 See for instance, Judgement of 18 July 2007, OY AA, C-231/05, EU:C:2007:439. 
90 Judgement of 28 January 1992, Bachmann, C-204/90, EU:C:1992:35. 
91 See Judgement of 21 December 2016, Commission vs Portugal, C-503/14, 
EU:C:2016:979, paragraph 62. 
92 Ibid., paragraph 64 
93 See C-446/03, Marks & Spencer, paragraph 43. 
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respect of both profits and losses.94 The court, in addition to this, also stated 
that a company should not have the right to choose in what state they want 
to be taxed as this could jeopardise the allocation of taxes.95 Thus, the court 
essentially stated that the justification requires there to be a symmetric 
approach to profits and losses between Member States, as well as within a 
Member State. 
3.2.4   Preventing the double use of losses 
The second justification that the CJEU stipulated in Marks & Spencer was 
the justification of ”preventing the double use of losses”. The CJEU simply 
stated that rules which aim to prevent that situation must be accepted, and 
that extending the British rules to cover foreign losses could lead to such 
unwanted situations.96  
It seems to the author that the justification for double use of losses and 
balanced allocation of taxing rights are more or less equivalent in their 
effect. As seen above, having a symmetric approach to profits and losses 
essentially covers that losses should not be used in more than one State.  
3.2.5   Preventing tax avoidance 
The last justification that was stipulated in the judgement was the 
justification to secure that the risk of tax avoidance was eliminated. Just like 
in the justification of preventing the double use of losses, the court held that 
by limiting the right to use losses to companies in the UK, that risk was 
effectively eliminated.97  
However, the justification of preventing tax avoidance has been dealt with 
more extensively in the case Cadbury Schweppes.98 In Cadbury Schweppes, 
the CJEU started by stating that even though taxpayers may not rely on EU 
law for fraudulent ends, that the freedom of establishment protects the right 
of the taxpayer to establish themselves abroad.99  
However, the court also stated that domestic legislations with the purpose to 
prevent “wholly artificial arrangement, put in place only to circumvent the 
                                                
94 Ibid., paragraph 45. 
95 Ibid., paragraph 46. 
96 See C-446/03, Marks & Spencer, paragraph 47.  
97 Ibid., paragraph 49. 
98 Judgement of 12 September 2006, Cadbury Schweppes plc and Cadbury Schweppes 
Overseas, C-196/04, EU:C:2006:544. 
99 C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes, paragraphs 35-38. 
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application of the domestic legislation”, can yet be justified by the need to 
prevent tax avoidance.100 
3.2.6   Justifying the Swedish rules 
Looking at the Swedish rules as a whole, the Swedish rules regarding 
mergers, intra-group contributions and intra-group deductions are partly 
based on the idea of a symmetric taxation in Sweden. However, the criteria 
of the so called ”direct link” might be harder to establish. That is in despite 
of the fact that the intra-group contribution rules stipulate that a contribution 
is only deductible for tax purposes for the payer if the contribution is taxable 
for the payee in Sweden. According to the author the criteria does not create 
a direct link since the transaction only amount to a cash flow advantage. As 
such, the author believes the rules would be hard to justify based on the 
cohesion of the Swedish tax system.  
Nevertheless, the rules do make sure that there is a symmetric treatment of 
profits and losses in-between Member States. The limits of those rules also 
make sure that companies cannot choose in what Member State they want to 
be taxed, since the rules only apply in Sweden and thus contribute to a 
balanced allocation of taxing rights. They also put limits on the use of 
losses. Only losses in Sweden can be utilised freely and by not allowing for 
deduction of a loss which is not considered final the rules prevent the double 
use of losses.   
Furthermore, the CJEU has previously dealt with similar rules in both the 
judgement Oy AA, which regarded the Finnish intra-group contribution rules 
(they seem to be very much like the Swedish ones) and the previously 
mentioned A OY, which regarded the Finnish merger rules (which also seem 
to work like the Swedish ones).  
In the both cases the CJEU held that the rules created restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment, as the legislations treated foreign subsidiaries 
worse than domestic subsidiaries. However, in Oy AA the restriction could 
be justified based on the balanced allocation of taxing rights, as taxpayers 
should not have the right to freely choose in which Member State they want 
to be taxed and such rules could also lead to tax avoidance. Even though 
rules with the purpose to counter abusive behaviours should normally only 
prevent wholly artificial arrangements, a legislation as the Finnish one needs 
to be examined as a whole and several justifications taken together can 
justify such legislation towards combating tax avoidance.  In A OY the rules 
could also be justified by a combination of several justifications. In that case 
                                                
100 Ibid., paragraph 55. 
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by securing a balanced allocation of taxing rights, preventing the double use 
of losses and preventing tax avoidance. 
As the Finnish and the Swedish tax consolidation rules serve similar 
purposes, being the utilisation of profits and losses within company groups, 
and because the Swedish and Finnish mergers rules seem to work in the 
same way, it must be concluded that it is most likely that the Swedish 
merger rules, intra-group contribution rules and intra-group deduction rules 
could be justified by a combination of balanced allocation of taxing rights, 
preventing double use of losses as well as preventing tax avoidance. The 
addition of tax avoidance is done by looking at the entire system as a whole. 
Nevertheless, it must be ascertained whether the rules go beyond what is 
necessary. 
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4   Proportionality 
4.1   The proportionality assessment in EU direct tax law 
In the direct tax cases of the CJEU the last step in the evaluation of 
legislations is the proportionality assessment. The assessment stems from 
the principle of proportionality, one of the general principles of EU law 
stipulated in the founding treaties.101 The principle must be respected in 
measures taken by both the institutions of the Union and by the Member 
States. Examples of when the principle must be respected include the 
evaluation of domestic legislations, in the adoption of directives or in the 
interpretation of EU legislations.102 
In direct tax cases where the CJEU has found a difference in treatment that 
can be justified by an overriding reason in the public interest, the court goes 
on to examine whether the restriction is appropriate to ensure the purpose of 
the legislation and to make sure that the restriction in the legislation does 
not go beyond what is necessary.103 
4.2   The proportionality requirements for merger rules 
4.2.1   Symmetry, but the demand for final losses 
In a previously mentioned case Krankenheim, which regarded the 
reinstatement of previously deducted foreign losses, the CJEU seem to 
establish the basis for any cross border proportionality assessment. The 
court held that the freedom of establishment does not demand Member 
States to draw up rules which in any situation removes disparities between 
tax legislations and justified that Germany reinstated losses from abroad 
when a exempt PE (from a tax perspective, essentially a subsidiary), started 
to make profits in the other state.104 It was, according to the court, because 
the treatment was based on a symmetric treatment of profits and losses in 
                                                
101 See for instance, article 5 (4) of the TEU. 
102 See for instance, TEU article 5 and C-14/16, Euro Park Service, paragraph 24 and 
paragraph 69. 
103 See for instance C-35/11, FII GLO 2, paragraph 55. 
104 See case C-157/07, Krankenheim, paragraph 50. 
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Germany.105 Lang states that the case is proof of the court trying to 
implement, as a breakthrough, symmetric taxation as a fundamental 
principle in EU law and the basis for the proportionality assessment of any 
measure in connection to the balanced allocation of taxing rights.106 The 
author agrees with Lang, based on Krankenheim in conjunction with, for 
instance Marks & Spencer and newer cases such as Damixa, the CJEU tends 
to hold that symmetry and the symmetric treatment of profits and losses 
should primarily govern tax rules. 
Nevertheless, in Marks & Spencer the court stated that a taxpayer should 
have the right to deduct a loss in a foreign subsidiary when the foreign 
subsidiary has exhausted all of its possibilities of ever taking that loss into 
account in the state of residence, either by the subsidiary or someone else in 
that state, also taking into account future or past periods.107 Furthermore, in 
A OY, the CJEU stated stated that allowing for the deduction of losses from 
a foreign subsidiary in a merger does not in itself (“a priori”) allow 
companies to freely choose where they want to be taxed and therefore does 
not jeopardise a balanced allocation of taxing rights,108 and that such 
legislation goes beyond what is necessary when it does not allow for the 
deduction of foreign losses when the subsidiary abroad has exhausted all the 
possibilities of ever taking those losses into account in that state.109 Thus, in 
A OY the court extended the Marks & Spencer-ruling to cover cross border 
mergers as well as tax consolidation systems, backing up the court’s 
previous case law.  In complete contradiction to what AG Kokott had 
suggested in her opinion.110 
Based on these general observations it can be determined that in EU law 
profits and losses are, in principle, to be treated symmetrically. This means 
that if a state cannot tax the profits they should not, in principle, allow for 
the deduction of losses.  However, EU law demands a way for the taxpayer 
to deduct final losses, both in regards to tax consolidation regimes as well as 
in cross border mergers. The Swedish rules regarding intra-group 
deductions serve to fulfil this demand. Despite that the rules de jure only 
applies to liquidations, the STA applies them de facto to cross border 
mergers as well. Thus, the application of the rules can be deemed to be 
carried out in an EU compatible way.  
Nevertheless, it has been stated that the intra-group deduction rules are 
restricted in certain scenarios and it must thus be ascertained whether these 
criteria are also compatible with the final loss-doctrine. 
                                                
105 Ibid., paragraph 42. 
106 See Lang, M., Has the Case Law of the ECJ on Final Losses Reached the End of the 
Line?,  European Taxation, 2014, p. 538. 
107 See case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer, paragraph 55 
108 See case C-123/11, A OY, paragraph 48. 
109 Ibid., paragraph 49. 
110 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 19 July 2012, A OY, C-123/11. 
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4.2.2   Final Losses 
The starting point in the final loss-doctrine can be found in paragraph 55 of 
the Marks & Spencer-ruling. There the CJEU states that losses are final 
when; 
(1) the non-resident subsidiary has exhausted the possibilities available in 
its State of residence of having the losses taken into account for the 
accounting period concerned by the claim for relief and also for previous 
accounting periods, if necessary by transferring those losses to a third party 
or by offsetting the losses against the profits made by the subsidiary in 
previous periods, and 
(2) there is no possibility for the foreign subsidiary's losses to be taken into 
account in its State of residence for future periods either by the subsidiary 
itself or by a third party, in particular where the subsidiary has been sold to 
that third party. 
Following the Marks & Spencer-ruling, the CJEU has further explained 
their vague statement in several cases. Apart from A OY and Krankenheim, 
the most noticeable cases are K111 and Commission vs UK112. However, final 
losses were also dealt with in Lidl Belgium113 a case which extended the 
final loss-doctrine to cover exempt PEs as well.  
In A OY the court had also to face two problems, apart from whether a 
merger constituted a treaty exercise and whether mergers were covered by 
the final loss doctrine, as seen above. In the case, which regarded a Finnish 
parent company with a Swedish subsidiary, the Finnish court asked the 
CJEU whether even the smallest income in the state of the subsidiary meant 
that the loss could not be seen as final. The court supposedly deals with this 
question in paragraphs 53 and 54 but does not provide for a clear answer. 
However, Danish. M. believes that the answer is affirmative and that it can 
be deduced from the context of the ruling. It seems as that she primarily 
bases her conclusion on the fact that the court leaves it up to the national 
courts to determine whether the subsidiary has truly exhausted all of the 
possibilities of taking their losses into account after pointing out that 
Sweden has an endless carry forward of losses.114 Furthermore, the court 
also had to deal with the question of which rules that should govern the 
calculation of the loss. AG Kokott had in her opinion argued for the 
approach that the calculation should, in principle, be made applying the 
                                                
111 See case C-322/11, K. 
112 See case, C-172/13, Commission vs UK. 
113 Judgement of 15 May 2008, Lidl Belgium, C-414/06, EU:C:2008:278, paragraphs 46-49. 
114 Danish, M, What remains of the Marks and Spencer Exception for Final Losses? – 
Examining the Impact of Commission v. United Kingdom (Case C-172/13), European 
Taxation 2015, p. 419. 
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rules in the state of residence.115 However, the court essentially answered 
that at the current state of EU law the freedom of establishment provides for 
no obligation of taking the laws of the foreign states into account when 
calculating the loss, neither does EU law require the resident state to only 
apply their own laws.116 Nevertheless, the court also stated that EU law 
precludes methods of calculation which creates unequal treatment between 
domestic and foreign subsidiaries.117 Thus, the court essentially leaves the 
question to the domestic laws to determine how to calculate such losses as 
long as the calculation is carried out in a non-discriminatory way. 
The case K, also a Finnish case, regarded a Finnish national owning a real 
estate in France on which he had made a loss. According to the tax treaty 
between Finland and France, Finland had no right to tax any gain of the real 
estate and, thus, denied the taxpayer the right to deduct the loss allocated to 
France. Nevertheless, in Finland, a loss on a domestic real estate investment 
is deductible towards a taxpayer’s overall income. Even though the 
difference in treatment could be justified, the taxpayer held that the loss 
should be considered final and, therefore, be deductible in accordance with 
the Marks & Spencer-criteria. However, in France on the other hand, losses 
on real estates are not deductible for tax purposes and the court held that 
when no possibility of utilising a loss exists in the state where the property 
is situated, the taxpayer can never end up in having exhausted all of the 
possibilities in that state.118 The CJEU also stated that when no possibility of 
taking a loss into account ever exists, that fact cannot form part of a 
proportionality analysis.119 These two statements seem, to the author, to be 
contradictory. Nevertheless, the author interprets the overall ruling as 
meaning that when a loss actually does not exist in the state where the loss 
has occurred, a loss in the state of residence cannot be deemed final. 
In Commission vs UK the court had a chance to develop their reasoning 
from K and A OY. In the case the Commission held that the British 
legislation did not practically fulfil the Marks & Spencer criteria. In the case 
the court clarified that losses cannot become final simply because the laws 
of another Member State put limits on such losses, such as through limited 
carry forward.120 Then the court also clearly expressed, that even a minimal 
income in the state where a loss making subsidiary is situated is enough to 
keep losses from becoming final.121 Thus, the case proves that Danish were 
right in her conclusion regarding the minimal income in A OY and also, 
seemingly, confirming the author’s interpretation of the K case. 
                                                
115 See AG Kokott, A OY, C-123/11, para 73. 
116 See case C-123/11, A OY, paragraph 58. 
117 Ibid., paragraph 59. 
118 See case C-322/11, K, paragraphs 76 & 77. 
119 See case C-322/11, K, paragraph 81. 
120 See case C-172/13, Commission vs UK, paragraph 33. 
121 Ibid., paragraph 36. 
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Evidently, the final loss-doctrine of the CJEU demands a possibility for the 
taxpayer to deduct losses that are de facto final. Losses are de facto final if 
they are not limited by the legislation in the state of the subsidiary. 
Examples of this are, if there is no right to deduct a loss in the first place or 
if the carried forward of losses is limited. Furthermore, losses in a 
subsidiary cannot be final if the loss can be offset even against the smallest 
of income in that state.  
However, when a de facto loss exists, the loss shall be calculated in a way 
which creates equal treatment between domestic and foreign subsidiaries. 
4.3   The proportionality of the Swedish rules 
4.3.1   Qualified mergers 
As described in part 2, Sweden has decided to separate mergers into two 
groups, qualified and unqualified mergers, but that an analysis had to be 
undertaken looking at the rules as a whole. 
Nevertheless, the MD was implemented by the Council as a way to 
harmonize cross border mergers within the EU, to reduce disparities 
between member states and to make cross border restructurings easier. The 
implemented Swedish rules do not contribute to this purpose.  
Thus, despite the fact that the Swedish rules should be looked upon as a 
whole, there is nothing in the jurisprudence of the CJEU that seem to justify 
denying foreign subsidiaries the benefits of the MD, in relation to mergers 
where that directive should apply. 
According to the author, that part of the legislation is, therefore, 
incompatible with EU law and the only way to make the legislation 
compatible with EU law is to include foreign subsidiaries by rephrasing the 
criterion. No less restrictive measure would suffice, and removing the 
“taxable according to the SITA”-criterion would not seriously jeopardise the 
balanced allocation of taxing rights.  
This conclusion prevails, despite the fact that the CJEU tend to be strict in 
their defence of cross border mergers, as it is hard to see that the court 
would allow rules which contradicts the purpose of a unifying measure 
taken at the community level without that measure also contradicting the 
case law of the court.  
Instead, it would be less restrictive to introduce limitations to the 
recognition of the tax continuity. For instance, by limiting foreign untaxed 
values to only be taken into account for ones, being at the time of the 
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merger. That would most likely be justifiable by not allowing for losses to 
be used twice. 
4.3.2   Unqualified mergers 
When looking at the unqualified mergers, the rules regarding intra-group 
deductions apply as a proportional measure to the intra-group contributions. 
The first limitation of the Swedish final loss rules regards the limits of 
taking a final loss into account because of a de jure-limitation in the other 
state, such as limited carry forward. This builds upon the idea that the 
Member States in the EU are not obliged to ”heal another states treatment” 
as stipulated in the Swedish SAC. The CJEU clearly stated that in the 
Commission vs UK that this is the way the Marks & Spencer-ruling should 
be read. Thus, it is completely in line with EU law to limit the deduction of 
losses to losses that are de facto-losses. 
The third limitation of the Swedish final loss rules is the demand for only 
taking the lowest value of the states involved into account. This also builds 
upon the idea that the Member States are not obliged to ”heal another states 
treatment”. In connection to this the Swedish legislation also limits the 
deduction of final losses up to the level of the profits in the parent company.  
First of all, the author believes that the Swedish rules regarding the 
calculation and the limits to the profits of the parent company are 
incompatible with EU law.  
The reason for this is that the author believes that EU law demands Sweden 
to apply their legislation the way AG Kokott argued in A OY, taking into 
account the loss as it would have been calculated in accordance with 
Swedish rules. The author agrees with AG Kokott, who essentially stated, 
that the only way to achieve equal treatment between domestic and foreign 
subsidiaries is applying the laws of the parent company to the losses in the 
foreign subsidiaries.122 Having a legislation which de facto treats foreign 
subsidiaries in comparable situations worse, was also deemed incompatible 
with EU law in FII GLO and the same reasoning can be applied here. 
However, it is true, as Lang states, that had the CJEU completely agreed 
with the AG in A OY, the court would have cited the AG without rephrasing 
their answer.123 Nevertheless, the court does not disregard the opinion of the 
AG either. By looking at the statement of the court, in the context of the 
cases K and Commission vs UK, the author believes it is possible to explain 
why the court responded in such way. According to the author, the reason 
                                                
122 See AG Kokott, A OY, C-123/11, para 73. 
123 See Lang, M, Has the Case Law of the ECJ on Final Losses Reached the End of the 
Line?,  European Taxation, 2014, p.533. 
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for this was to not create a misconception that the rules of the parent state 
should always guiding, for instance when a loss is limited by the laws in the 
other state. 
Furthermore, a connection to exit taxes and step-up values, which 
essentially is the opposite to the deduction of final losses, can be drawn. 
Applying different step-up values, or not applying any step-up at all, in 
different Member States lead to equal issues, essentially broadening the tax 
basis of Member States’ and in turn double taxation.124 Applying the 
Swedish calculation on loss deduction to step-ups i.e. applying the lowest 
value as step-up, calculated based on the exporting and importing state, 
would, effectively, lead to double taxation. That is because the importing 
Member State could increase their tax basis to include values not accrued on 
their territory. According to the author, that is the same situation as regards 
intra-group deductions in Sweden, because Sweden essentially taxes non-
accrued values when the deductible amount is lower in the other Member 
State than according to Swedish rules and Sweden only takes into account 
for the former amount. Despite the fact that the CJEU has refrained itself 
from dealing with double taxation, the effects are contradictory to the 
purpose of the internal market. 
According to the author, the conclusion also aligns more with the idea of 
analysing a restrictive situation from the perspective of one taxpayer rather 
than every party involved, something which was discussed in part 3.   
Furthermore, this conclusion also entails that the loss cannot be limited to 
the profits in the parent company. The reason behind this is because the 
Swedish rules allow intra-group contributions even when it creates losses 
for the payer. Thus, limiting the deduction to the profits of the parent would 
once again lead to a de facto difference in treatment which goes beyond 
what is necessary.  
Another argument in favour of the author’s conclusions can be found in 
Krankenheim, and also in Damixa, where the CJEU essentially states that 
recognising the tax treatment, and thus, essentially, the tax laws, of another 
Member State is not demanded by EU law.125 
Consequently, the Swedish rule requiring a loss to exist according to the 
legislation in the other Member State is proportional and compatible with 
EU law. Nevertheless, limiting the losses to the lowest value of the states 
involved and to a maximum of the profits in the parent company go beyond 
what is necessary and these limitations are incompatible with EU law. 
                                                
124 See van den Hurk, H, van den Broek, H and Korving, J, Final Settlement Taxes for 
Companies: Transfer of Seats, Interest Charges, Guarantees and Step-Ups in Value, 
Bulleting for International Taxation, 2013, p. 264. 
125 Case C-157/07, Krankenheim, paragraph 50 or case C-593/14, Damixa, paragraphs 40-
41. 
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5   Summary and Conclusions 
5.1   Summary 
Mergers are transactions which entail the dissolution of one company 
through the overtaking of assets and obligations by another. The tax rules 
regarding mergers include two different kind of mergers, qualified and 
unqualified mergers. Some of these rules apply to the same situations.  
When a merger fulfils the criteria of being qualified, tax continuity applies. 
However, the Swedish rules regarding qualified mergers create a difference 
between foreign and domestic subsidiaries as the rules practically excludes 
foreign subsidiaries.  
When a merger is not qualified, it is instead unqualified. In those cases, the 
Swedish rules regarding tax consolidation apply as an unqualified merger 
can be carried out without tax consequences anyways if the tax 
consolidation rules apply. Nevertheless, these rules are only applicable to 
companies established in Sweden, but allows for foreign losses to be 
deducted if they are considered final. To be considered final the loss cannot 
be limited by laws in the other country. Furthermore, when a loss is final the 
deduction is limited to the lowest value calculated based on other states 
involved and up to a maximum amount of the profits in the parent company. 
Both set of rules are aimed at substantial ownership and therefore create 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment. Even though parts of the rules 
are based on a directive, they fall within the scope of the fundamental 
freedoms as the rules must be looked upon as a whole. The rules cause a 
restriction from the view of the parent company, because a company 
establishing a subsidiary abroad is treated worse than a company 
establishing a subsidiary in Sweden, and the merger of a foreign subsidiary 
is part of the same treaty exercise as establishing abroad. 
Rules which treat taxpayers from different Member States worse can be 
justified if they serve a public interest and do not go beyond what is 
necessary to reach that goal. Looking at the merger rules as a whole, the 
rules can be justified as they contribute to a balanced allocation of taxation, 
making sure that losses cannot be used twice and to hinder tax avoidance.  
Nevertheless, not allowing foreign subsidiaries to benefit from the tax 
continuity of qualified mergers goes beyond what is necessary, as less 
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restrictive measures could be enacted, such as limiting the utilisation of 
losses or re-valuations so they cannot be used more than ones. 
Rules for mergers falling out of the Merger Directive must at least allow for 
the deduction of final losses but can be allowed certain restrictions. It is 
allowed to not deduct a loss because another state has put legal limits on 
that loss or because even the smallest chance of using a loss exists in the 
other state. The Swedish rules are thus proportional in that regard. 
Nonetheless, when a loss is deemed to be final, such loss cannot be 
calculated in a discriminatory way, meaning that it is not allowed to only 
deduct the lowest amount of the loss calculated based on the rules of the 
states involved or limiting the deduction up to the amount of profits in the 
parent company. In those regards, the Swedish rules go beyond what is 
necessary.  
5.2   Conclusions on the compatibility of the Swedish rules 
The Swedish rules have been found to be in part compatible and in part 
incompatible with EU law.  
According to EU law: 
-   It is prohibited to deny foreign subsidiaries access to the benefits of 
the MD 
o   Paragraph 11, chapter 37 of the SITA is, thus, incompatible 
with EU law 
-   It is prohibited to not allow for a deduction of final losses in cross 
border mergers and, therefore, rules cannot be limited to certain 
types of restructuring (such as liquidations) 
o   Paragraph 5 (1), chapter 35 a of the SITA is, thus, 
incompatible with EU (However, it is not practically applied 
this way) 
-   It is proportional to have rules which denies a deduction of final 
losses which are limited through the foreign legislation 
o   Paragraph 6 (2), chapter 35 a of the SITA is, thus, compatible 
with EU law 
-   It is prohibited to only deduct the lowest value calculated based on 
the Member States involved 
o   Paragraph 7 (1), chapter 35 a of the SITA is, thus, 
incompatible with EU law 
-   It is also prohibited to only allow for a deduction of final losses up to 
the level of profits in the parent company  
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o   Paragraph 7 (2), chapter 35 a of the SITA is, thus, 
incompatible with EU law 
5.3   The pending case before the Swedish Supreme 
Administrative Court – the Conclusion 
Going back to the pending case before the SAC, the author will provide for 
a comment on the case at hand. 
First of all, the case regards a Swedish Parent company with German 
subsidiary who could not qualify for tax continuity based on not being 
taxable in Sweden. As it has been concluded that this requirement is 
incompatible with EU law, the subsidiary should be allowed tax continuity 
on that point. Nevertheless, when reading the decision of the BATR it can 
be deduced that the subsidiary will not be transformed into a PE after the 
merger. Thus, the merger would not fulfil the criteria required to benefit 
from the favourable tax treatment of the MD and the directive is 
inapplicable. Evidently, Sweden should now allow for tax continuity in this 
particular case anyways.  
Based on the previous, the merger is an unqualified merger. The author 
agrees with the board that the full extent of the rules regarding intra-group 
contributions can be limited to mergers between Swedish companies and 
that they are not applicable. The author also agrees with the opinion of the 
STA stating that the rules regarding final losses found in chapter 35 of the 
SITA should be guiding.  
The legislation in Germany does not allow for the transfer of losses in a 
national merger. This would, thus, allow Sweden to deny the deduction of 
any potential loss, as it can be argued that such loss cannot be considered to 
be final according to the settled case law from the CJEU. Nonetheless, it is 
also the view of the author that the jurisprudence of the CJEU does not 
provide for complete answer to the question on whether not allowing for a 
loss to be carried over through a merger falls within the “legal limitations 
scope”. However, it seems as if the CJEU is moving towards a limitation of 
the final loss doctrine rather than the opposite. Based on this, the author 
believes that the majority of the BATR has reached the correct conclusion in 
regards to the deductibility of the losses.  
However, the author would also like to provide for another aspect to the 
situation. If Germany does not allow for the transfer of losses in mergers, 
even if the losses are deemed to fulfil the requirement of being final, it 
would create a situation where the German legislation could be incompatible 
with EU law. If the German legislation would indeed be incompatible with 
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EU law and Germany should allow for such losses to be deducted, then the 
situation could, in turn, lead to the existence of a deductible loss from a 
Swedish perspective.  
Despite that, the Krankenheim judgement indicates that even if a restriction 
exists, but that restriction is allocated to the other state, then the state of 
residence should not bear the consequences of that restriction. Thus, 
Sweden should, nonetheless, not be obliged to step in and ”heal” the 
unfavourable German treatment. 
Evidently, the majority of the BATR has come to a correct conclusion. 
Despite that, the author would also suggest that the SAC uses the case to 
request a preliminary ruling from the CJEU. The case would be a good 
indicator for all Member States on determining how national loss utilisation 
regimes should co-exist with cross border restructurings in the EU. 
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